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Refining the Derogation Test on Material Tax
Selectivity: The Equality Test
Begoña Pérez-Bernabeu*
The research focuses on the problems that the ECJ has found in recent cases at applying the
classic three step selectivity test in the area of taxation. The Court is confrontedwith theMem-
ber States’ attempt to circumvent the State aid rules by creating ad hoc general tax systems
so there is no general system against which the tax measures can be assessed. In order to
avoid this circumvention, the ECJ has shifted its case law on material tax selectivity towards
a new “comparability test” (also called “equality test”) based on a non-formalistic approach
which takes into account the underlying objectives of the tax measure. This “comparability
test” encompasses an objectives-based approach which provides Member States a higher de-
gree of freedom. However it seems to be rather vague because it involves the difficult task of
distinguishing permissible goals from impermissible goals which irretrievably leads us to a
case-by-case analysis which does not provide the desirable degree of legal certainty and pre-
dictability. The main conclusion of this research is that the criterion of material tax selectiv-
ity is not definitively formulated in the ECJ case law but, on the contrary, it is open to refine-
ments in order to meet the challenges that current and future State aid cases may raise.
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I. Preliminary Remarks
1. Tax Measures as State Aid
Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Rome, the
European Court of Justice (hereafter ECJ) applied State
aid disciplines to tax measures as early jurisprudence
shows in cases 30/59, De Gesamenlijke Steenkolenmij-
nen in Lumburg vs. High Authority of the European Coal
and Steel Community1 and 173/73, Italian Republic vs.
Commission of the European Communities.2 Taxation
was not the initial focus of the State aid rules, but the
European judicature made it clear in some early judg-
ments that the restriction applies to all forms of public
aid including all kinds of relief from taxation normal-
ly imposed and that the restrictiondoes not distinguish
between measures of State intervention in respect to
their causes or their aims but solely to their effects.3
However the Commission’s practice set aside tax
measures while examining State Aid measures over
decades, arguing that they involved an intervention
in a sovereign policy area of the Member States. It
was not until the 90s that the Commission decided
to apply State aid law systematically to tax measures
within a new legal framework aimed at tackling
harmful tax competition.4
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1 Case 30/59 De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v
High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community
[1961] ECR I-0001.
2 Case C-173/73 Italy v Commission [1974] ECR I-709.
3 P Rossi-Maccanico, ‘The Gibraltar Judgment and the point on
selectivity in fiscal aids’ (2009) 2 EC Tax Review, 67, 67.
4 C Micheau, ‘Tax selectivity in European Law of State Aid: legal
assessment and alternative approaches’ (2015) 3 European Law
Review, 323, 323.
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Nowadays the Commission’s rules with regard to
State aid assessment are provided in theCommission
Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Ar-
ticle 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union.5
2. Selectivity in State Aids
There is no legal definition of “general” or “selective”
measures in the acquis communautaire.6 Moreover
the ECJ hardly provides a definition of ‘general’ mea-
sures, thus the discussed notions are purely doctrine
based.7
Already in its early case law, the Court has devel-
oped a tax selectivity test in the landmark judgment
Italian Textile (Case 173/73), where it ruled that a tax
measure is to be considered selective if it is intend-
ed to partially exempt undertakings from charges
arising from the normal application of the general
system of taxation. The ECJ has since then repeated-
ly held that selective advantages exist where a mea-
sure departs from the normal application of the tax
system.
The concept of selectivity consists of two compo-
nents. One of them is the geographical selectivity, un-
der which a State measure is selective if undertak-
ings located in a specific part of the territory of a
Member State receive a different (better) treatment
than in the rest of the territory.
In order to assess regional selectivity, the Commis-
sion remarks that, following the rationale of the es-
tablished case law,8 three scenarios must be distin-
guished. In this context, case lawhas so far only dealt
with tax measures. However, as regional selectivity
is a general concept, the principles set out by the
Union Courts as regards tax measures apply to oth-
er types of measures as well.9
In the first scenario the central government of a
Member State unilaterally decides to apply a lower
level of taxation within a defined geographical area.
The second scenario corresponds to symmetrical
devolution of tax powers – amodel of distribution of
tax competences in which all infra-State authorities
at a particular level (regions, districts or others) of a
Member State have the same autonomous power in
law to decide the applicable tax rate within their ter-
ritory of competence, independently of the central
government. In this case, the measures decided by
the infra-State authorities are not selective as it is im-
possible to determine a normal tax rate capable of
constituting the reference framework.
In the third scenario – the asymmetrical devolu-
tion of tax powers – only certain regional or local au-
thorities can adopt tax measures applicable within
their territory. In this case, the assessment of the se-
lective nature of the measure at stake depends on
whether the authority concerned is sufficiently au-
tonomous from the central government of the Mem-
ber State. This is the case when the following cumu-
lative criteria of autonomy are fulfilled: institution-
al, procedural, and economic and financial autono-
my. If all of these criteria of autonomy are present
when a regional or local authority decides to adopt a
tax measure applicable only within its territory, then
the region in question, not theMember State, consti-
tutes the geographical reference framework. 
The Commission summarises the content of these
three criteria of autonomy. Firstly, the existence of
institutional autonomy can be established where the
tax measure decision has been taken by a regional or
local authority with its own constitutional, political
and administrative status that is separate from that
of the central government. The assessment of
whether this criterion has been fulfilled in each in-
dividual case should include, in particular, examina-
tion of the constitution and other relevant laws of a
given Member State so as to verify whether a given
region indeed has its own separate political and ad-
ministrative status and whether it has its own self-
governing institutions which have the power to ex-
ercise their own fiscal competence.10
In respect to the existence of procedural autono-
my, the Commission considers that it can be estab-
5 European Commission, Notice of 19 July 2016 on the notion of
State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, 2016/C 262/01, OJ C 262,
19.7.2016, p. 1-50.
6 P Nicolaides, M Kekelekis and P Buyskes, State Aid Policy in the
European Community: A Guide for Practicioners (Kluwer Law
International 2005), 25.
7 J Kociubiński, ‘Selectivity criterion in state aid control’ (2012) 2(1)
Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics, 1, 4.
8 Case C-88/03 Portugal v Commission [2006] ECR I-07115, [57] et
seq. and Joined Cases C-428/06 to C-434/06 Unión General de
Trabajadores de La Rioja, [2008] I-06747, [47] et seq.
9 European Commission, Notice of 19 July 2016 on the notion of
State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union, 2016/C 262/01, paragraph 143.
10 European Commission, Notice of 19 July 2016 on the notion of
State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, 2016/C 262/01, paragraphs
145-146.
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lished when a tax measure decision has been adopt-
ed without the central government being able to di-
rectly intervene in determining its content. The es-
sential criterion for determining whether procedural
autonomy exists is not the extent of the competence
that the infra-State body is recognised as having, but
the capability of that body, in view of its competence,
to adopt a decision on a tax measure independently,
that is to say without the central government being
able to intervene directly as regards its content.
The fact that a consultation or conciliation proce-
dure exists between the central and regional (or lo-
cal) authorities to avoid conflicts does not automati-
cally mean that an infra-State body does not have
procedural autonomy, provided that that body, and
not the central government, has the final word on
the adoption of the measure at stake. The mere fact
that the acts which an infra-State body adopts are
subject to judicial review does not in itself mean that
that body lacks procedural autonomy, since the exis-
tence of such review is an inherent feature of the rule
of law.A regional (or local) taxmeasure does not have
to be completely separate from a more general tax
system for not being considered State aid. In partic-
ular, it is not necessary that the tax system in ques-
tion (bases of assessment, tax rates, tax recovery rules
and exemptions) is fully devolved to the infra-State
body. For example, corporate tax reimbursement lim-
ited to the power to vary rates within a limited range,
without devolving the power to change the bases of
assessment (tax allowances and exemptions, etc.),
could be considered as fulfilling the procedural au-
tonomy condition if the pre-defined rate bracket al-
lows the region concerned to exercisemeaningful au-
tonomous powers of taxation, without the central
government being able to directly intervene as re-
gards the policy content.11
Finally, according to theCommission the existence
of economic and financial autonomy can be estab-
lished where an infra-State body assumes responsi-
bility for the political and financial consequences of
a tax reduction measure. This cannot be the case if
the infra-State body is not responsible for managing
a budget, that is to say when it does not have control
of both revenue and expenditure. Therefore, in es-
tablishing the existence of economic and financial
autonomy, the financial consequences of the taxmea-
sure in the region must not be offset by aid or subsi-
dies from other regions or the central government.
Hence, the existence of a direct causal link between
the tax measure adopted by the infra-State body and
the financial support from other regions or the cen-
tral governmentof theMemberState concernedrules
out the existence of such autonomy.12
The existence of economic and financial autono-
my is not undermined by the fact that a shortfall in
tax revenues as a result of the implementation of de-
volved tax powers (for example a lower tax rate) is
offset by a parallel increase in the same revenues due
to the arrival of new businesses attracted by the low-
er rates. The autonomy criteria do not require the
rules governing tax collection to be devolved to the
regional or local authorities, nor do they require the
tax revenues to actually be collected by those author-
ities. The central government may continue to be re-
sponsible for collecting devolved taxes if the collec-
tion costs are borne by the infra-State authority.13
Ontheotherhand,material selectivity encompass-
es all forms of unequal treatment of public authori-
ties. Material selectivity may be established by law
or de iure selectivity (when the legislation explicitly
awards tax advantages to certain undertakings) or in
fact or de facto selectivity (when the advantage is not
expressly awarded by law and only a case-by-case
analysis can reveal the selectivity of the measure).
When Member States adopt ad hoc positive mea-
sures benefitting one or more identified undertak-
ings (for instance, granting money or assets to cer-
tain undertakings), it is normally easy to conclude
that suchmeasures have a selective character, as they
reserve favourable treatment for one or a few under-
takings. The situation isusually less clearwhenMem-
ber States adopt broader measures applicable to all
undertakings fulfilling certain criteria, which miti-
gate the charges that those undertakings would nor-
mally have to bear (for instance, tax or social securi-
ty exemptions for undertakings fulfilling certain cri-
teria). In such cases, the selectivity of the measures
should normally be assessed by means of an analy-
11 European Commission, Notice of 19 July 2016 on the notion of
State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, 2016/C 262/01, paragraphs
147-151.
12 European Commission, Notice of 19 July 2016 on the notion of
State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, 2016/C 262/01, paragraphs
152-155.
13 European Commission, Notice of 19 July 2016 on the notion of
State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, 2016/C 262/01, paragraphs
152-155.
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sis that involvesaneffects-basedapproach in the field
of general measures or that consists of a three-steps
analysis, in the field of tax measures, as explained
below.
II. Assessing Material Selectivity in State
Aids: The Effects-Based Approach
1. The Commission Practice: from the
Effects-On-Rivals Approach to the
Effects-Based Approach
Past practice seems to have focused on the impact of
State aid on competitors’ profits. In this context, the
European Commission and the ECJ interpreted the
concept of State aid broadly, so the legal requirement
that aid must have a potential effect on competition
and trade between Member States was easily satis-
fied.14
In the past the Commission considered that “State
aid must be selective and thus affect the balance be-
tween certain firms and their competitors” and to
prove this “it is sufficient if it can be shown that the
beneficiary is involved in an economic activity and
that he operates in a market in which there is trade
between Member States”.15 This brief description of
the criteria defining State aid shows that the scope
of Community State aid rules is wide (but not open-
ended).
Heidhues and Nitsche remark that formerly, the
analysis of whether aid does adversely affect trading
conditions to an extent contrary to the common in-
terest has rarely involved a coherent economic analy-
sis of the effects of State aid on competition. Indeed,
these authors clarify that there have been only very
few cases where the effect on competition and trade
was analysed by theCommission in detail andplayed
a role in the decision adopted. This implies that yes-
teryear the European Commission was likely to have
allowedaid that harms competitionwhile at the same
time forbidding aid that would have been benefi-
cial.16 Consequently, these authors conclude that
there are obvious arguments as to why simply equat-
ing “distortion of competition” with “less rivalry” is
not appropriate and that competition should be a
means to an end and not an end in itself.17
Due to these problems and since the ECJ consid-
ered that the Commission had not adequately looked
at the economic evidence inAirtours andTetra Laval-
lSidal, the European Commission strengthened,
through its administrative practice, a trend towards
a more effects-based analysis in EU competition pol-
icy that applied both to the assessment of competi-
tion cases, where more emphasis was put on the
analysis of facts, as well as to the development of soft
law.
But it was in 2005 when a paradigm shift took
place in State aid control with the move towards a
“more economic approach” in the State Aid Action
Plan (SAAP),18 a far-reaching reform package in
terms of EU State aid control whose aim is to pro-
mote better-targeted aid while offering better pre-
dictability of State aid, better economic results and
better governance.19 The SAAP claims for “a refined
economic approach” when assessing State aid by
means of “making more use of a refined economic
approach is a means to ensure a proper and more
transparent evaluation of the distortions to competi-
tion and trade associated with state aid measures”.20
Onthebasis of economicanalysis21a seriesofmea-
sures are offered to Member States to grant aid and
to better target their funds to measures that are on
balance beneficial to the common interest.
The main novelty that the new refined economic
approach brought was the adoption of the balancing
test which is applied only in the second stage of the
assessment of State aid in order to study the compat-
ibility of the measure with the provisions of Article
14 P Heidhues and R Nitsche, ‘Comments on State aid reform. Some
implications of an effects-based approach’ (2006) 1 European
State Aid Law Quarterly, 23, 24.
15 European Commission, Staff Working Document of 15 of Novem-
ber 2004 Vademecum Community Rules on State Aid, SEC(2004)
1453, 3-4.
16 P Heidhues and R Nitsche, ‘Comments on State aid reform. Some
implications of an effects-based approach’ (2006) 1 European
State Aid Law Quarterly, 23, 24.
17 P Heidhues and R Nitsche, ‘Study on methods to analyse the
impact of State aid on competition’ (2006) 244 Economic Papers
(European Economy, European Commission, Directorate-General
for Economic and Financial Affairs), 5.
18 European Commission, State Aid Action Plan (SAAP). Less and
better targeted State aid: a roadmap for State aid reform
2005-2009, COM(2005) 107 final.
19 L Roeller and O Stehmann, ‘The year 2005 at DG Competition:
the trend towards a more effects-based approach’ (2008) 28
Review of Industrial Organization, 281, 286 and 304.
20 European Commission, State Aid Action Plan (SAAP). Less and
better targeted State aid: a roadmap for State aid reform
2005-2009, COM(2005) 107 final, paragraph 22.
21 The 2006 R&D&I Framework was the first application of the
refined economic approach advocated by the 2005 State Aid
Plan, COM(2005) 107 final.
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107(3) TFEU. The objective of the balancing test is to
show that somemeasures adopted byMember States
raise economic efficiency without causing excessive
distortion of intra-Community trade and competi-
tion.
The balancing test consists of three questions as-
sessing the positive and negative effects of the
planned measure. In particular, the balancing test
specifies that State aid is only acceptable insofar as:
a) It addresses a well-defined market failure.
b) It is well targeted.
c) It does not distort competition too much so that it
can be on balance compatible with the common
market.
In light of these positive and negative elements, the
Commission balances the effects of the measure and
determines whether the resulting distortions ad-
versely affect trading conditions to an extent con-
trary to the common interest. The analysis in each
particular casewill be based on anoverall assessment
of the foreseeable positive and negative impacts on
the given State aid. In doing this, the Commission
does not workmechanically, but makes an overall as-
sessment based on the proportionality principle.
The effects-based approach requires an evaluation
of the measure adopted by a given State from an eco-
nomic perspective. Roeller and Stehmannmake clear
that “an effects-based approach requires a careful ex-
amination of how competition works in each partic-
ular market. By focusing on the effects of company
actions rather thanon the formthat these actionsmay
take, an effects-basedapproachmakes the circumven-
tion of competition policy constraints more difficult
for companies. At the same time, this approach pro-
videsamoreconsistent treatmentofpractices. It takes
into account that many business practices may have
different effects in different circumstances, distort-
ing competition in some cases and promoting effi-
ciencies and innovation in others. As the assessment
is not based on the form of a particular practice but
on the anticompetitive effect, the competition author-
ity needs to identify a theory of harm and assess the
extent to which such a negative effect on consumers
is potentially outweighed by efficiency gains”.22
2. The Effects-Based Approach in Tax-
Related State Aid Case Law
The ECJ takes into consideration this effects-based
approach while analysing the effects of a tax mea-
sure at issue. An example of it is the Gibraltar case,
where the ECJ stated that Article 107(1) TFEU “does
not distinguish between measures of State interven-
tion by reference to their causes or their aims but de-
fines them in relationship to their effects, and thus
independently of the techniques used”.23
Paepe24 sums up the more relevant consequences
of the adoption of the effects-based approach by the
ECJ. In his opinion, the effects-based approach en-
tails, firstly, that a (tax) measure cannot escape State
aid control on the basis of the aims that measure is
pursuing. This does notmean that the objectives pur-
sued by a tax measure are irrelevant for State aid law
purposes. The aim of the tax measure can duly be
taken into account when the compatibility of a State
aidmeasure is examinedunderArticle 107(3)TFEU.25
Moreover, the effects-based approach also means
the formof the taxmeasure is not decisive for its qual-
ification as State aid or, on the contrary, to avoid such
a qualification. The EU Courts ruled that the notion
of State aid covers any aid granted through State re-
sources – in any form whatsoever – which, in terms
of its effects, distorts or threatens to distort compe-
tition”.26 The exception from the Gibraltar case cited
above underlines that State aid should be defined “in-
dependently of the techniques used”.27
In spite of the effect-based approach, Paepe con-
siders that the selectivity test, which ultimately is
aimed at identifying whether the tax measure under
scrutiny “favour[s] certain undertakings or the pro-
duction of certain goods”, needs to have regard, at
least to some extent, to the form and the aim(s) of
22 L Roeller and O Stehmann, ‘The year 2005 at DG Competition:
the trend towards a more effects-based approach’ (2008) 28
Review of Industrial Organization, 281. 282.
23 Joined cases C-106/09P and C-107/09P Gibraltar [2011] ECR
I-11113, [87].
24 P Paepe, “Taxing Games Of Chance: EU State Aid Law And The
Member States' Power To Tax Games Of Chance”, available at
<http://www.mondaq.com/x/257914/Income+Tax/
Taxing+Games+Of+Chance+EU+State+Aid+Law+And+The+Mem
ber> accessed 10 January 2017.
25 Case C-487/06 P, British Aggregates [2008] ERC I-10515, [92].
26 Case C-124/10 P European Commission v Électricité de France
(EDF) [2012] published in the electronic Reports of Cases (Court
Reports - general), [88].
27 Joined cases C-106/09P and C-107/09P Gibraltar [2011] ECR
I-11113, [87]. See also Case T-210/02 British Aggregates v Com-
mission [2006] ERC II-02789 which was set aside by Case
C-487/06 P British Aggregates [2008] ERC I-10515, [89].
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the tax measure whose qualification as State aid is at
stake.28
III. Assessing Material Selectivity in Tax
Measures: The Derogation Test
As mentioned above, the Commission makes clear
that whenMember States adopt ad hoc positivemea-
sures benefitting one or more identified undertak-
ings (for instance, granting money or assets to cer-
tain undertakings), it is normally easy to conclude
that suchmeasures have a selective character, as they
apply favourable treatment for one or a few under-
takings. The situation isusually less clearwhenMem-
ber States adopt broader measures applicable to all
undertakings fulfilling certain criteria, which miti-
gate the charges that those undertakings would nor-
mally have to bear (for instance, tax or social securi-
ty exemptions for undertakings fulfilling certain cri-
teria). In such cases, the selectivity of the measures
should normally be assessed bymeans of a three-step
analysis.29
This three-step methodological analysis – also
called “derogation test”30 – has been set up by the EU
Courts and applied mainly to tax measures. This test
has been applied over the years leading to refine-
ments and due clarifications, but certain difficulties
in interpretationhave also emerged and there are dis-
crepancies both in theCommission’s practice and the
EU Courts case law.31
The Commission’s Notice on the notion of State
aid as referred to inArticle 107(1) of theTFEU32 refers
to this three-step test and explains the scrutiny to be
effectuated while applying it.33
Under the “derogation test” a measure is selective
where it constitutes derogation from the standard ap-
plication of the tax system. In doing this, the gener-
al tax system should first be determined and second-
ly the derogation from this general tax system should
be appraised.
The ECJ clearly summarises this test in its judg-
ment on the joined cases T‑211/04 and T‑215/04,
Gibraltar vs. Commission34 stating that “in order for
it to classify a tax measure as selective, it must begin
by identifying and examining the common or ‘nor-
mal’ regime under the tax system applicable in the
geographical area constituting the relevant reference
framework. It is in relation to this common or ‘nor-
mal’ tax regime that the Commission must, second-
ly, assess and determine whether any advantage
granted by the tax measure at issue may be selective
by demonstrating that the measure derogates from
that common regime inasmuch as the measure dif-
ferentiates between economic operatorswho, in light
of the objective assigned to the tax system of the
Member State concerned, are in a comparable factu-
al and legal situation (…) If the Commission, in the
course of the first two stages of its assessment, has
demonstrated the existence of derogations from the
common or ‘normal’ tax regime resulting in a differ-
entiation between undertakings, it is clear from set-
tled case law that such a differentiation is none the
less not selective when it arises from the nature or
general scheme of the system of charges of which it
forms part. In that situation, the Commission must
determine, in a third stage, whether the State mea-
sure inquestion isnot selective innature even though
it gives an advantage to the undertakings which are
able to benefit from it (…). In that regard, given that
the differentiations provided for vis-à-vis the com-
mon or ‘normal’ tax regime constitute derogations
and are prima facie selective, it is for the Member
State to show that those differentiations are justified
by the nature and general scheme of its tax system
in that they derive directly from the basic or guiding
principles of that system. In that context, a distinc-
tionmust bemade between, on the one hand, the ob-
28 P Paepe, “Taxing Games Of Chance: EU State Aid Law And The
Member States' Power To Tax Games Of Chance”, available at
<http://www.mondaq.com/x/257914/Income+Tax/
Taxing+Games+Of+Chance+EU+State+Aid+Law+And+The+Mem
ber> accessed 10 January 2017.
29 European Commission, Notice of 19 July 2016 on the notion of
State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, 2016/C 262/01, paragraphs
126-128.
30 Although different terms have been used over the last 30 years to
describe this test, see C Micheau, ‘Tax selectivity in European Law
of State Aid: legal assessment and alternative approaches’ (2015)
3 European Law Review, 323, 328.
31 R Cisotta, ‘Criterion of selectivity’ in H Hoffmann and C Micheau
(eds), State aid law of the European Union (Oxford University
Press 2016), 131-132.
32 European Commission, Notice of 19 July 2016 on the notion of
State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, 2016/C 262/01
33 European Commission, Notice of 19 July 2016 on the notion of
State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, 2016/C 262/01, paragraphs
132-141.
34 European Commission, Notice of 19 July 2016 on the notion of
State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, 2016/C 262/0, paragraphs
143-144.
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jectives attributed to a particular tax regime and
which are extrinsic to it and, on the other, the mech-
anisms inherent in the tax system itself which are
necessary for the achievement of such objectives”.
The above explained test can be schematised in
three steps. In the first step, a tax reference frame-
work must be determined previously, because “the
determination of the reference framework has a par-
ticular importance in the case of tax measures, since
theveryexistenceofanadvantagemaybeestablished
only when compared with ‘normal’ taxation”.35
While determining the “common” or “normal” tax
regime in a particularMember State, one should bear
in mind that this analysis does not require compar-
ing the tax regime applicable in other EU Member
States, because the tax differences between Member
States are not relevant for determining the normal
tax regime for State aid law purposes.36 By contrast,
the proper benchmark can only be determined by
looking at the nature and structure of a tax system
as awhole andnot by the initial tax base alone,which
is especially important in cases where all but few are
exempted from a tax (hence only few are subject to
tax) or – contrarily – where all but few are entitled
to a tax benefit.37
In the second step – once the tax reference frame-
work is determined – the “derogatory character” of
the tax measure is to be assessed, that is “it must be
assessed and determined whether any advantage
granted by the tax measure at issue may be selective
by demonstrating that the measure derogates from
that common regime inasmuch as it differentiates
between economic operators who, in the light of the
objective assigned to the tax system of the Member
State concerned, are in a comparable factual and le-
gal situation”.38
Paepe considers that the demonstration of the
derogatory character of the taxmeasure under scruti-
ny involves in itself three sub-steps.39 Firstly, the ob-
jective of the tax measure in question must be deter-
mined in order to provide an analytical framework
to establish the group of comparable economic oper-
ators; and the broader the objective identified the
larger the group of economic operators that will be
found to be in a comparable situation.
Theauthorremarks thatcase lawreveals that some-
times the objective of the tax measure in question is
determined,40whereas in other cases the objective of
the tax reference framework is the element to be de-
termined,41 concluding that the tax measure at issue
and the tax reference framework usually do not coin-
cide. In these situations, the author considers it is un-
clear which objective should be taken into account.42
In this regard, Kurcz and Vallindas also point out
that the test established by the Courts refers once to
the “measure in question” and at another time to
“scheme in question”, but they believe that these two
words (measure and scheme) are used interchange-
ably.43 In contrast, Bartosch considers that the differ-
entiation between “measure” and “scheme” may in-
deed have a substantive meaning because if it is the
“measure” that is required and sufficient, thenMem-
ber States would in principle be free to pursue their
respective political goals by individual acts even ap-
plying to only one single undertaking. However if a
“statutory scheme” were required, this would prima
facie render it difficult for such measures to be per-
missible, as the relevant benchmark (directly or in-
directly) apply only to a limited number of undertak-
ings, maybe even one.44
Moreover, this author has reached the conclusion
that most cases in which the EU Courts has explicit-
ly identified the objective pursued by the tax mea-
35 Case C-88/03 Portugal v Commission [2006] ECR I-07115 [56];
Case C-408/04P Salzgitter [2013] ERC I-02767, [81]; Case
T‑210/02 RENV British Aggregates [2012] published in the elec-
tronic Reports of Cases (Court Reports - general), [49].
36 P Paepe, ‘Taxing Games Of Chance: EU State Aid Law And The
Member States’ Power To Tax Games Of Chance’, available
at:<http://www.mondaq.com/x/257914/Income+Tax/
Taxing+Games+Of+Chance+EU+State+Aid+Law+And+The+Mem
ber> (last accessed on 10 January 2017).
37 R Luja, ‘Revisiting the balance between aid, selectivity and
selective aid in respect of taxes and special levies’ (2010) 1
European State Aid Law Quarterly, 161, 164.
38 Case T‑210/02 RENV British Aggregates [2012] published in the
electronic Reports of Cases (Court Reports - general), [49].
39 P Paepe, ‘Taxing Games Of Chance: EU State Aid Law And The
Member States' Power To Tax Games Of Chance’, available
at:<http://www.mondaq.com/x/257914/Income+Tax/
Taxing+Games+Of+Chance+EU+State+Aid+Law+And+The+Mem
ber> (last accessed on 10 January 2017).
40 For example Case C-279/08 P European Commission v Kingdom
of the Netherlands [2011] ECR I-07671 [62].
41 For instance Joined cases C-78/08 to C-80/08 Paint Graphos
[2011] ECR I-07611 [49].
42 P Paepe, ‘Taxing Games Of Chance: EU State Aid Law And The
Member States’ Power To Tax Games Of Chance’, available
at:<http://www.mondaq.com/x/257914/Income+Tax/
Taxing+Games+Of+Chance+EU+State+Aid+Law+And+The+Mem
ber> (last accessed on 10 January 2017).
43 B Kurcz and D Vallindas, ‘Can general measures be … selective?
Some thoughts on the interpretation of a State aid definition’
(2008) 45 Common Market Law Review, 159, 172.
44 A Bartosch, ‘Is there a need for a rule of reason in European State
aid law? Or how to arrive at a coherent concept of material
selectivity?’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review, 729, 742.
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sure it seems to identify only one objective.45 But in
other cases a particular tax measure can pursue oth-
er objectives than the objective to generate financial
means for the State (for example, environmental or
social objectives). The author underlines that in the
cases where a non-revenue generating objective was
identified, the EU Courts reasoned that the non-rev-
enue generating objective took precedence over the
revenue generating objective. In this context, Paepe
points out that there is a question that does not find
an answer in case law, because it is currently unclear
how a taxmeasure should be assessed when it is pur-
suing both a revenue generating and a non-revenue
generating objective, with both objectives carrying
the same weight.46
Notwithstanding the need of determining the ob-
jective of the tax measure in question, the ECJ re-
minds that, since the concept of State aid is defined
in relation to its effects and not to its objectives, the
objective identified cannot impede the qualification
of the tax measure as State aid.47
The first time that the ECJ referred to “objectives
pursued” in the field of selectivity of a tax measure
and this objective was regarded to be decisive for the
determination of whether a State measure could be
regarded to be prima facie selective,48was in its land-
mark judgment in Adria-Wien Pipeline, when it said
that “under a particular statutory regime, a Statemea-
sure is such as to favour certain undertakings or the
production of certain goodswithin themeaning of ar-
ticle 92(1) of the Treaty (article 107(1) TFEU) in com-
parison with other undertakings which are in a legal
and factual situation which is comparable in the light
of theobjectivepursuedbythemeasure inquestion”.49
Bartosch considers that in Adria-Wien the Court of
Justice clearly accepted the primordial role to be
playedby the objectives definedby theMemberState
itself when devising a regime that differentiated be-
tween two (or more) different groups of undertak-
ings.50 This author considers that the general accep-
tance of an objectives-based approach so introduced
into the State aid case law by the Adria-Wien ruling
does not give Member States a carte blanche to de-
clare all kinds of political goals to qualify as such ob-
jectives, which then will have to be endorsed by the
Commission, with the competence of the latter be-
ing consequently reduced to a mere checking for
manifest errors. However, the objectives-based ap-
proach solution also reveals a much higher degree of
freedomgranted to theMemberStateswhich in turns
casts doubts on the more rigid approach advocated
by the Commission in decisions and communica-
tions adopted prior to Adria-Wien.51
Consequently, it would be highly desirable to
maintain a differentiation between “good” or permis-
sible objectives thatMemberStatesmaypursuewith-
out having to justify them in terms of State aid con-
trol and impermissible or “bad” objectives that ren-
der a given measure materially selective. Notwith-
standing this proposal, the author is aware of the
practical difficulties it may entail, since not every
measure is based on a clear-cut “good” or “bad” ob-
jective, becausemanymay feature amixture of both.
Moreover, in many cases, it may be uncertain which
objective is a side or subsidiary objective.52
Secondly, the group of economic operators or
goods in a comparable factual and legal situation
should be apprised in light of the objective pursued
by the taxmeasure at stake.While doing this, the EU
Courts may find comparable situations53 or may not
find any comparability at all54or evenmayuse a com-
petition or substitutability test as a proxy.55
45 As concluded the ECJ in Joined cases C-106/09P and C-107/09P
Gibraltar [2011] ECR I-11113, [101] (introduction of a general
system of taxation for all companies); Joined cases C-78/08 to
C-80/08 Paint Graphos [2011] ECR I-07611 (taxation of company
profits) and Case T‑210/02 RENV British Aggregates [2012]
published in the electronic Reports of Cases (Court Reports -
general) (environmental protection).
46 P Paepe, ‘Taxing Games Of Chance: EU State Aid Law And The
Member States’ Power To Tax Games Of Chance’, available at
<http://www.mondaq.com/x/257914/Income+Tax/
Taxing+Games+Of+Chance+EU+State+Aid+Law+And+The+Mem
ber> (last accessed on 10 January 2017).
47 Case C-487/06P British Aggregates [2008] ECR I-10515, [85].
48 Bartosch considers that the most outstanding fact in the Adira-
Wien pronouncement is that the Court was willing to accept a
clearly objectives-based approach in the area of material selectiv-
ity, see A Bartosch, ‘The concept of selectivity’ in E Szyszczak
(ed.), Research Handbook on European State aid law (Edward
Elgar Publishing Limited 2011), 180.
49 Case C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline [2001] ECR I-08365, [41].
50 A Bartosch, ‘The concept of selectivity’ in E Szyszczak (ed.),
Research Handbook on European State aid law (Edward Elgar
Publishing Limited 2011), 181.
51 A Bartosch, ‘Is there a need for a rule of reason in European State
aid law? Or how to arrive at a coherent concept of material
selectivity?’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review, 729, 745.
52 A Bartosch, ‘The concept of selectivity’ in E Szyszczak (ed.),
Research Handbook on European State aid law, (Edward Elgar
Publishing Limited 2011), 189-190.
53 Like in Case T‑210/02 RENV British Aggregates [2012] published
in the electronic Reports of Cases (Court Reports - general) [73].
54 Joined cases C-78/08 to C-80/08 Paint Graphos [2011] ECR
I-07611, [55-61].
55 Like the General Court did in Case T‑210/02 RENV British Aggre-
gates [2012], [72].
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Thirdly it must be examinedwhether the taxmea-
sure at issue differentiates between economic oper-
ators or goods that are in a comparable factual and
legal situation. If this question is answered in the
positive, the tax measure will give rise to a selective
advantage (unless, the selectivenatureof the taxmea-
sure can be justified in step 3). For example the Gen-
eral Court considers that the fact that certain opera-
tors or products are exempted from the tax at issue
will lead to a tax differentiation and, therefore, to tax
selectivity.56On the contrary, if the question receives
a negative answer, the taxmeasurewill therefore not
amount to State aid, because there is no tax differ-
entiation and, consequently, no selective advan-
tage.57
Luja considers that an analysis of comparability
between operators – based on legal and factual cir-
cumstances – may have to be done at more than one
level. Thus the comparability test may be seen as a
speciesof thenature-and-structure test (or thenature-
and-general-scheme test), an affirmative answer to
which would result in non-selectivity as a result of
an exclusion or exemption from tax being a logical
part of the special tax or levy at hand given its ratio-
nale.58
In the third step – lastly, and only in the case that
the tax measure in particular has been found selec-
tive – it is necessary to verify if that measure is jus-
tified by the nature of general logic of the system of
which it is a part.59 This justification first appeared
in case 173/73, Italy v. Commission60 in 1974 in an
obiter dictum and it was revived in the 1990s not on-
ly in the ECJ’s case law61 but also in the Commission’
decisional practice62 and lays down the rule that to
different situations different treatment should be ap-
plied.
The principle of justification by the nature and the
scheme of the system is of particular relevance in the
field of indirect taxation, which targets production
and where a certain harmonisation has been
achieved; and it applies in two situations, when it is
necessary for the proper functioning of the system
or when they reflect the objectives pursued by the
State measure.63
The ECJ has applied the inner logic excuse in the
field of indirect taxes without prejudices in several
cases like, for instance,GIL insurance,64but theCourt
has been traditionally reluctant65 to accept this jus-
tification in State aid cases on direct taxes until the
Gibraltar case, where no derogation from the gener-
al tax systemwas present and the Court accepted this
justification in direct taxes as well.
According to Rossi-Maccanico’s point of view, this
third step implies that the assessment of selectivity
merges into the examination of justification, because
when an exception to the general tax system is justi-
fied by the nature of the scheme, the tax advantage
entailed by the exception is not selective, but is rather
the general rule for a specific situation.66 In this line,
Luja goes a step beyond and considers that the com-
parison and the nature justification can occur not on-
ly at the stage of examination of an advantage or the
selectivity, but at the verification of the scope of a
specific charge or levy.67
56 Case T‑210/02 RENV British Aggregates [2012], [75].
57 P Paepe, ‘Taxing Games Of Chance: EU State Aid Law And The
Member States' Power To Tax Games Of Chance’, available at
<http://www.mondaq.com/x/257914/Income+Tax/
Taxing+Games+Of+Chance+EU+State+Aid+Law+And+The+Mem
ber> (last accessed on 10 January 2017).
58 R Luja, ‘Revisiting the balance between aid, selectivity and
selective aid in respect of taxes and special levies’ (2010) 1
European State Aid Law Quarterly, 161, 164.
59 It is sometimes used in different terms, such as “justification by
the nature or overall structure of the system” or “justification by
the inherent logic of the system”; see R Szudoczky and JL Van de
Streek, ‘Revisiting the Dutch interest box under the EU State aid
rules and de Code of Conduct: when a disparity is selective an
harmful’ (2010) 38(5) Intertax, 260, 267.
60 Case C-173/73 Italy v Commission [1974] ECR I-00709.
61 C Micheau, ‘Tax selectivity in State aid review: a datable case
practice’ (2008) 17(6) EC Tax Review, 276, 278.
62 Szudoczky and Van de Streek point out that the justification by
the nature and general scheme of the tax system has a long
history in the case law and the Commission’s practice. The
Commission notice on the application of the State aid rules to
measures relating to direct business taxation of 1998 expressive-
ly recognised that the selective nature of a measure may be
justified by the nature of the general scheme of the system, see R
Szudoczky and JL Van de Streek, ‘Revisiting the Dutch interest
box under the EU State aid rules and de Code of Conduct: when
a disparity is selective an harmful’ (2010) 38(5) Intertax, 260,
267.
63 J Kociubiński, ‘Selectivity criterion in state aid control’ (2012) 2(1)
Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics, 1, 14.
64 Case C-308/01 GIL Insurance [2004] ECR I-04777
65 In 2009, the ECJ Judge Lenaerts pointed out that the ECJ has
never accepted the “inner logic” excuse in State aid cases on
direct taxes, see K Lenaerts, ‘State aid and Direct Taxation, EU
Competition Law’ in H Kanninen, N Korjus and A Rosas (eds),
Contest: Essays in Honour of Virpi Tiili, (Oxford 2009), 291-306.
66 P Rossi-Maccanico, ‘The specificity criterion in fiscal aid review:
proposals for State aid control of direct business tax measures’
(2007) 16(2) EC Tax Review, 90, 96.
67 R Luja, ‘Revisiting the balance between aid, selectivity and
selective aid in respect of taxes and special levies’ (2010) 1
European State Aid Law Quarterly, 161, 163.
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Micheau considers that the applicationof the strict
derogation test in the assessment of the selectivity
(which implies that a very broad range of tax mea-
sures qualifies as selective in the first step) should be
counterbalanced by the function of the nature justi-
fication.68
Although there are only few cases where the EU
Courts concluded that the selective nature of a tax
measure was justified,69 the ECJ70 has cited as poten-
tial justification grounds the purpose of redistribu-
tion and the criterion of ability to pay.71
Bartoschnotes that the case lawof the ECJ has con-
ducted the very same assessment as developed in re-
lation to fiscal measures to a number of other areas,
showing that the specific assessment of material se-
lectivity has been conceived for purposes of evaluat-
ing fiscal measures and spread to a number of other
areas.72
IV. Recent Shift in the EU Court’s
Jurisprudence
Unfortunately the “derogation test” and the tradition-
al three-step analysis did not lead to totally satisfac-
tory results andmay be complex to applywhen there
is no general tax system against which the tax mea-
sures can be assessed. In this context the ECJ may
find problems at determining the appropriate refer-
ence framework in situations in which the entire tax
system should be assessed with regard to the selec-
tivity or with regard to stand-alone schemes.73 The
Commission makes clear that in certain exceptional
cases it is not sufficient to examine whether a given
measure derogates from the rules of the reference
system as defined by the Member State concerned.
It is also necessary to evaluate whether the bound-
aries of the system of reference have been designed
in a consistent manner or, conversely, in a clearly ar-
bitrary or biased way, so as to favour certain under-
takings which are in a comparable situation with re-
gard to the underlying logic of the system in ques-
tion.74
The reason for these problems lies on the fact that
Article 107(1) of the Treaty does not distinguish be-
tween measures of State intervention in terms of
their causes or aims, but defines them in relation to
their effects, regardless of the techniques used.75Due
to this the ECJ had to face two kind of problematic
situations.
On the one hand, sometimes the reference system,
as defined by theMember State concerned, although
founded on criteria that were of a general nature, dis-
criminated in practice between companies which
were in a comparable situationwith regard to the ob-
jective of the tax reform, resulting in a selective ad-
vantage. A clear example of this was the joined Cas-
es C-106/09 P and C-107/09 P76 concerning the Gibral-
tar77 tax reform. The Gibraltar Government repealed
its entire corporate tax system in order to introduce
an entirely new one applicable to undertakings es-
tablished in its territory. As Micheau stresses, the is-
sue was to assess whether the new tax system was
selective in favour of offshore companies, since the
latter had no physical presence in Gibraltar, they
would have been subject to a very limited tax bur-
den.78 The ECJ considered that the tax scheme was
selective since the combination of the tax measures
68 C Micheau, ‘Tax selectivity in State aid review: a datable case
practice’ (2008) 17(6) EC Tax Review, 276, 282.
69 Case C-353/95P Tiercé Landbroke [1997] ECR I-07007.
70 Case C-88/03 Portugal v Commission [2006] ECR I-07115, [82].
71 P Paepe, ‘Taxing Games Of Chance: EU State Aid Law And The
Member States' Power To Tax Games Of Chance’, available at
<http://www.mondaq.com/x/257914/Income+Tax/
Taxing+Games+Of+Chance+EU+State+Aid+Law+And+The+Mem
ber> (last accessed on 10 January 2017).
R Luja, ‘Revisiting the balance between aid, selectivity and
selective aid in respect of taxes and special levies’ (2010) 1
European State Aid Law Quarterly, 161, 164.
72 A Bartosch, ‘Is there a need for a rule of reason in European State
aid law? Or how to arrive at a coherent concept of material
selectivity?’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review, 729, 743.
73 C Micheau, ‘Tax selectivity in European Law of State Aid: legal
assessment and alternative approaches’ (2015) 3 European Law
Review, 323, 339.
74 European Commission, Notice of 19 July 2016 on the notion of
State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, 2016/C 262/01, paragraph
129.
75 Case C-487/06 P British Aggregates [2008] ERC I-10515, [85,89]
and the case law cited; Case C-279/08 P European Commission v
Kingdom of the Netherlands [2011] ECR I-07671 [51]; and Joined
cases C-106/09P and C-107/09P Gibraltar [2011] ECR I-11113,
[87].
76 Joined cases C-106/09P and C-107/09P Gibraltar [2011] ECR
I-11113.
77 As said before, the Court has never accepted the justification of
the nature and the scheme of the system in State aid cases on
direct taxes until the Gibraltar case, where no derogation from the
general tax system was present and the Court accepted this
justification in direct taxes for the first time.
78 C Micheau, ‘Tax selectivity in European Law of State Aid: legal
assessment and alternative approaches’ (2015) 3 European Law
Review, 323, 338.
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of the Gibraltar reform, although they seemed to be
general in nature, excluded from taxation offshore
companies which did not occupy business property
and had no employees.
On the other hand there are other situations con-
cerning special-purpose levies, in which the Court
found elements indicating that the boundaries of the
levy have been designed in a clearly arbitrary or bi-
ased way, so as to favour certain products or certain
activities which are in a comparable situation with
regard to the underlying logic of the levies in ques-
tion. For instance, in Ferring,79 the Court of Justice
considered that a levy imposed on the direct sale of
medicinal products by pharmaceutical laboratories
but not on the sale by wholesalers was selective. In
light of the particular factual circumstances – such
as the clear objective of the measure and its effects –
the Court did not simply examine whether the mea-
sure in question would lead to a derogation from the
reference system constituted by the levy. It also com-
pared the situations of the pharmaceutical laborato-
ries (subject to the levy) and of the wholesalers (ex-
cluded), concluding that the non-imposition of the
tax on the direct sales by the wholesalers equated to
granting them a prima facie selective tax exemp-
tion.80
The Court is aware of these inefficiencies arising
from the three-step analysis and acknowledges that
exceptional cases require another approach. For this
reason the ECJ has reacted and keeps refining the test
of material tax selectivity. Consequently, in recent
cases like Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri vs Re-
gione Sardegna,81 Paint Graphos and Commission82
and Spain vs. Government of Gibraltar and United
Kingdom83andNOx,84 theECJhas ruled that theques-
tion of the presence of an economic advantage and
the question of selectivity are not only closely con-
nected, but merge with each other and may eventu-
ally be arbitrarily exchanged.85
In these judgments the Court has applied the
Azores formula concerning justification of a prima
facie selective measure by the intrinsic principles of
the general fiscal system to these cases in which the
Court has perceived a will to circumvent the State
aid rules by creating ad hoc general systems and not
exceptions to them or, in the Court’s words, by using
a “certain regulatory technique”.86
The new orientation in the EU Court’s jurispru-
dence on material tax selectivity is aimed to avoid
the circumvention and its main tool is the “end of
formalism approach”87 since the Court held that any
tax differentiation did not necessarily imply the ex-
istence of State aid, because it is also required that
the measure is capable of pre-determining a particu-
lar category of beneficiaries according to their spe-
cial features.88
This new trend in the ECJ case law adds a new di-
mension to the classic selectivity test in the area of
taxation. This new tendency to overcome the formal-
ism has also influenced the case law of the Court con-
cerning other criteria of the concept of aid.
Through these judgments, the ECJ revisited the
concept of selectivity and redefined thewidth of the
State aid examination of whole tax regimes, broad-
ening the material selectivity test and thus, the
scope ofArticle 107TFEUwitnessing a shift towards
a new “comparability test” or “equality test” mean-
ing that not every case of differentiation is forbid-
den.
Amidst the above mentioned cases, the landmark
case Paint Graphos89 before the ECJ is particularly
worth mentioning. The Court held that for a finding
of selectiveness of a tax regime, it is necessary to iden-
tify the “normal” tax regime and to establish that a
derogation from that normal regime is afoot, favour-
ing certain taxpayers.90
79 Case C-53/00 Ferring [2001] ECR I-09067, [19-20].
80 European Commission, Notice of 19 July 2016 on the notion of
State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, 2016/C 262/01, paragraph
131.
81 Case C-169/08 Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri v Regione
Sardegna [2009] ECR I-10821.
82 Joined cases C-78/08 to C-80/08 Paint Graphos [2011] ECR
I-07611.
83 Joined cases C-106/09P and C-107/09P Gibraltar [2011] ECR
I-11113.
84 Case C-279/08 P European Commission v Kingdom of the Nether-
lands [2011] ECR I-07671.
85 M Lang, ‘State Aid and Taxation: Recent Trends in the case law of
the ECJ’ (2012) 2 European State Aid Law Quarterly, 411, 420.
86 JJ Piernas López, The concept of State aid under EU law: from
internal market to competition and beyond (Oxford University
Press 2015), 150.
87 JJ Piernas López, The concept of State aid under EU law: from
internal market to competition and beyond (Oxford University
Press 2015), 150.
88 Joined cases C-106/09P and C-107/09P Gibraltar [2011] ECR
I-11113, [71].
89 Joined cases C-78/08 to C-80/08 Paint Graphos [2011] ECR
I-07611.
90 P Watte, ‘Some Fringe Areas of EU State Aid Lawin Direct Tax
Matters’ in D Weber and G Maisto (eds), EU income tax law:
issues for the years ahead (IBFD 2013), 145-146.
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In point of fact, in paragraph 4991 of this case, the
ECJ has developed a very wide understanding of the
concept of selectivity when it comes to taxation, by
establishing a three-step test for selectivity. In the
first step, the “normal taxation” under the national
reference system, againstwhich any derogation is de-
termined. The second step examines whether the
measure in question constitutes a derogation from
the reference system so that undertakings which are
in a legally or factually comparable situation in light
of the objective pursued by the tax system are treat-
ed differently. Finally, in a third step, the ECJ exam-
ines whether it is possible to justify such derogation
by the nature of internal structure of the reference
system laid out in the first step.92
As Ismer states, this three step test can be under-
stood as imposing a requirement of consistency on
Member States, because while the choice of tax base
lies with the Member States, they have to transpose
this choice in a logically consistent manner.93 Conse-
quently, this “new” comparability test implies that
tax exemptions can be justified if the measure com-
plies with a requirement of external consistency (ob-
jective scope) and an internal consistency require-
ment that demands the measure to be inherent with
the general logic of the tax system.
When it comes to the assessment of a State mea-
sureunder theheadingofmaterial selectivity thenew
“comparability test” is to be counterbalanced by an
objectives-based approach or, in other words, this
new test consists of the comparison of two legal and
factual situations in order to compare the two differ-
ent tax treatments in light of the objective of themea-
sure.
Under this case law the ECJ is obliged to look in-
to the entirety of the schemes presented to them and
analyse themaccording to the objectives theypursue.
On this subject, it is important to remark that the sole
formulation of the objectives of a taxmeasure or sys-
tem by national authorities implies important conse-
quences as regards the application of the selectivity
test.94However themere absenceof anyexplicitmen-
tion of an impermissible objective in the statement
of reasons or the legislative history will as such not
be sufficient to declare that measure non selective.95
V. Material Selectivity in the State Aid
Test and Fundamental Freedoms
Analysis: Convergence of Assessment
Criteria
The prohibition on State aid, like the prohibition on
fundamental freedomsare aimed toprotect free com-
petition in the internal market, but they work in a
different way, because State aids rules ensure that
Member States do not provide selective advantages
to certain undertakings while removing obstacles to
the freemovement of services, goods, capital andper-
sons is theobjectiveof fundamental freedoms.96Sim-
ilarities between the State aid and the freedom of
movement restriction tests have been pointed out by
legal scholars,97 although the object remains clearly
separated.
91 Joined cases C-78/08 to C-80/08 Paint Graphos [2011] ECR
I-07611, [49]: “In order to classify a domestic tax measure as
‘selective’, it is necessary to begin by identifying and examining
the common or ‘normal’ regime applicable in the Member State
concerned. It is in relation to this common or ‘normal’ tax regime
that it is necessary, secondly, to assess and determine whether
any advantage granted by the tax measure at issue may be selec-
tive by demonstrating that the measure derogates from that com-
mon regime inasmuch as it differentiates between economic
operators who, in light of the objective assigned to the tax system
of the Member State concerned, are in a comparable factual and
legal situation”.
92 R Ismer, ‘Judicial review of tax laws: the coherence requirement’
in K Messerschmidt and D Oliver-Lalana (eds), Rational Lawmak-
ing under review (Springer 2016), 229.
93 R Ismer, ‘Judicial review of tax laws: the coherence requirement’
in K Messerschmidt and D Oliver-Lalana (eds), Rational Lawmak-
ing under review (Springer 2016), 229.
94 R Cisotta, ‘Criterion of selectivity’ in H Hoffmann and C Micheau
(eds), State aid law of the European Union (Oxford University
Press 2016), 147.
95 A Bartosch, ‘Is there a need for a rule of reason in European
State aid law? Or how to arrive at a coherent concept of materi-
al selectivity?’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review, 729,
751.
96 Moreover, it is important to remark that the scope of prohibition
on State aid is much broader than that of fundamental freedoms,
because it applies to cross-border situations and also to all under-
takings, while fundamental freedoms apply only to cross-border
situations and prohibit only discrimination of non-residents.
97 F Vanistendael, EU freedoms and Taxation, EATLP Congress, Paris
3-5 June 2004 (Amsterdam: IBFD 2006). R Luja, ‘Revisiting the
balance between aid, selectivity and selective aid in respect of
taxes and special levies’ (2010) Issue 1 European State Aid Law
Quarterly, 161, 164; W Sauter and H Vedder, ‘State aid and
selectivity in the context of missions trading: an examination of
the ECJ’s 2011 NOx Case (C-279/08)’ (2010) TILEC Discussion
Paper, 11; C Micheau, ‘Relationships between fundamental
freedoms and State aid law’ (2012) 52(5) European Taxation, 209,
210; F Engelen and A Gunn, ‘State aid: towards a theoretical
assessment framework’ in A Rust and C Micheau (eds), State aid
and Tax Law, (Kluwer Law International 2013), 135-151; M
Villar Ezcurra, ‘State aids and energy taxes: towards a coherent
reference framework’ (2013) 41(6-7) Intertax, 340, 343; R Cisotta,
‘Criterion of selectivity’ in H Hoffmann and C Micheau (eds),
State aid law of the European Union (Oxford University Press
2016), 147-149.
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One thing that seems to be common to State aids
and fundamental freedoms is the consideration of
the objective pursued by the nationalmeasure. In the
field of State aid rules, the objective of the measure
is taken into consideration regarding the compatibil-
ity of the aid with the internal market, whereas re-
garding fundamental freedom rules, the objective
pursued is the basis of the restriction to free move-
ment and has to provide grounds for justification of
the restriction in question. Thus, while evaluating
measures adopted by a Member State, the Court of
Justice has to acknowledge the existence of a valid
justification for a restriction to freedoms of move-
ments provoked by such measures and the admissi-
bility of certain objectives under State aid law.98
Cissota considers that the comparison regarding
the evaluation of the coherence of national legisla-
tion is useful in this regard and has found some sim-
ilarities between these two systems (freedom of
movements and State aid), since the ECJ – while tak-
ing into consideration the appropriateness of the na-
tional legislation for the attainment of the declared
objective and assesses the coherence of the legisla-
tion – carries out this part of the test substantially in
the same way like in Hartlauer99 (freedom of estab-
lishment) and Adria-Wien Pipeline100 (tax on energy
considered State aid) cases.
However, thisconvergenceofcriteriadoesnotmean
a complete analogy. Indeed, Luja alerts that one should
keep inmind that the State aid analysis and the analy-
sis of infringement of a fundamental freedom, while
going hand in hand, may have totally different out-
comes. For instance, if non-taxation would be the
benchmark for a State aid analysis (leading up to a
vast majority of those subject to tax to being exempt)
it may still be that the actual levying of tax on some
(who are so discouraged from entering the market)
leads to an infringement of fundamental freedoms.101
Cissota also alerts about the differences existing
during theperformanceof the test in the field ofState
aid and in the freedom of movements. Firstly, in the
context of freedom of movements, the ECJ has af-
firmed that national legislation is appropriate for en-
suring attainment of the objective pursued only if it
genuinely reflects a concern to attain it in a consis-
tent and systematicmanner. In this strain of case law,
the contrast between the State action and the gener-
al objective pursued by its legislation –which reveals
an inadmissible incoherence under the freedom of
movement rules – has sometimes seemed to be de-
tected as quite stark, while in the domain of State aid
an extrinsic objective – which is pursued by the na-
tional legislation at issue has to be already consid-
ered when the comparison between the situations of
the subjects concerned is drawn; as seen, such sub-
jects have to be in a comparable factual and legal sit-
uations in light of that objective.102
Moreover, when dealing with fundamental free-
doms, the Court of Justice does not openly address
the question as to the comparability of the situations
of the undertakings involved in light of the objective
pursued – even if, of course, it verifies whether there
is a discrimination or a difference in treatment –
while it has been shown that under State aid law this
is an important branch of the test applied. On the
other hand, in the freedoms of movement domain,
the analysis is first of all focused on the inclusion of
the objective pursued amongst those recognised by
the Treaties or by the case law as legitimate objec-
tives while under State aid law every objective, oth-
er than the aim of restricting competition or intra-
EU trade, is, in principle, admissible.103
Another point that both systems share in common
is the relationship between the notion of selectivity
and the proportionality principle (also called equali-
ty principle). Micheau remarks that the ECJ has
evolved important and restrictive sets of rules to
frame the law applicable to a breach of fundamental
freedom. In essence, unless they are justified, nation-
al measures cannot constitute an obstacle to the ap-
plication of fundamental freedoms. Depending on
the fundamental freedom involved, there are various
reasons which can be put forward to justify a restric-
tive national measure (for example, public morality,
public security, jurisprudential justifications, such as
the effectiveness of fiscal supervision of the fairness
98 R Cisotta, ‘Criterion of selectivity’ in H Hoffmann and C Micheau
(eds), State aid law of the European Union (Oxford University
Press 2016), 147-149.
99 Case C-169/07 Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Wiener Lan-
desregierung and Oberosterreichische Landesregierung [2009]
ECR I-01721, [56-63].
100 Case C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline [2001] ECR I-08365, [52].
101 R Luja, ‘Revisiting the balance between aid, selectivity and
selective aid in respect of taxes and special levies’ (2010) 1
European State Aid Law Quarterly, 161, 164.
102 R Cisotta, ‘Criterion of selectivity’ in H Hoffmann and C Micheau
(eds), State aid law of the European Union (Oxford University
Press 2016), 147-148.
103 R Cisotta, ‘Criterion of selectivity’ in H Hoffmann and C Micheau
(eds), State aid law of the European Union (Oxford University
Press 2016), 147-148.
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of commercial transactions). These restrictions are
permissible only if they comply with the principle of
proportionality inasmuch as they do not go further
than what is necessary to achieve their objectives.104
Similarly, the proportionality test has been intro-
duced by the Court with regard to the selectivity cri-
terion in the sphere of State aid. This proportionali-
ty test, however, does not apply to assess the depar-
ture fromthegeneral tax system; it is used to appraise
the justification by the logic of the tax system.105
Regarding thisquestion,VillarEzcurra remarks that
the assessment of the proportionality criteria in the
field of State aid is very similar to that ruled by the ECJ
doctrine in Sardinia106 regarding fundamental free-
doms. Closely related, Sauter andVedder consider that
the principle of equality also plays an important role
in thedomainof State aid, inasmuchas the assessment
of selectivity essentially involves the equality principle
since one undertakingmay not be favoured compared
to another undertaking in a comparable situation.107
Following this line of reasoning, Vanistendael
highlights the fact that selectivity means discrimina-
tory treatment, the question could come up whether
a measure which discriminates between undertak-
ings could at the same time be regarded as State aid
and as a restriction on the fundamental freedoms.108
This idea is not foreign to EU case law which claims
that a tax measure could be regarded as a breach of
a fundamental freedom as well as State aid.
Concerning this eventual double qualification, the
ECJ stated its approach for the first time in the found-
ing Iannelli & Volpi case109 accepting that the same
taxmeasure can fall bothwithin the scopeof the rules
on State aid and free movement of goods. The Court
has maintained its approach over the years, and has
applied it recently in the Sardegna case110 where the
Court came to the conclusion that the tax measure at
issue constituted a breach of freedom to provide ser-
vices and also fell within the scope of Article 107 of
the TFEU.
In order to assess whether ameasure should be re-
garded not only as State aid but also an infringement
of fundamental freedoms, the Court introduced in its
pronouncement of Iannelli & Volpi the “severability
test”, according to which a State aid whose mere con-
sequence is the preferential treatment of certain do-
mestic products cannot be regarded as violation of
free movements of goods:
“those aspects of aidwhich contravene specific pro-
visions of the Treaty other than Articles 107 and 108
(ex. Articles 92 and 93) may be so indissolubly linked
to the object of the aid that it is impossible to evalu-
ate them separately so that their effect on the compat-
ibilityor incompatibilityofaidviewedasawholemust
therefore of necessity be determined in the light of the
procedure described in Article 108 (ex. Article 93)”.111
This intricate approach of the Court has not been
clarified by later case law, thus determining the as-
pects of the preferential treatment of the State aid
which are so indissolubly linked to their object that
it is impossible to evaluate them separately is still a
complex task that leaves room for debate.112
Moreover, as Micheau notes, it is regrettable that
the Court has not yet been faced with the concrete
application of a double qualification of the same tax
measure, in particular with regard to the issue of
remedies because the same remedies do not apply to
both a breach of fundamental freedoms and a viola-
tion of State aid rules. If a tax measure is considered
to be an illegal State aid within the meaning of Arti-
cle 107 TFEU, then the aid should be recovered, how-
ever a breach of fundamental freedom would allow
the undertaking which has paid the tax at issue to be
reimbursed.113
104 C Micheau, ‘Fundamental freedoms and State aid rules under EU
law: the example of taxation’ (2012) 52(5) European Taxation,
210, 213.
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Law Review, 323, 343.
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VI. Closing Remarks
It is clear that the three-step analysis should be im-
proved in order to avoid a circumvention of the ma-
terial selectivity test through fiscal techniques, as in
the Gibraltar case. In this task, a new trend based on
a non-formalistic approach which takes into account
theunderlyingobjectives of the taxmeasure is aprag-
matic solution and could be useful but, due to the
multi-purpose nature of tax measures which very of-
ten pursue different goals,114 this solution fails to
confer the desirable level of legal certainty.
In this context, there is an underlying tension re-
garding the objectives pursued by Member States.
On the one hand, if Member States are allowed to
use all sorts of political objectives to justify the tax
measures and avoid the qualification of being mate-
rially selective, State aid control will be deprived of
its effectiveness. As Bartosch asserts, the general ac-
ceptance of an objectives-based approach does not
give Member States a carte blanche to declare all
kinds of political goals to qualify as such objectives,
which then will have to be endorsed by the Commis-
sion, with the competence of the latter being conse-
quently reduced to a mere checking for manifest er-
rors.115
On the other hand, if the test of selectivity does
not take at all into consideration the objective pur-
sued, the selectivity criterion will be enlarged to an
unacceptable level andconsequently, itwouldbevery
difficult for any taxmeasure to escape from being re-
garded as selective and, since Advocate General Geel-
hoed expressed in the Gil Insurance case,116Member
States would be deprived of competences they enjoy
pursuant to the Treaty provisions.
It is true that the objectives-based approach added
recentlyby theECJ to the three-step analysis provides
Member States a higher degree of freedom and goes
beyond the rigid approach advocatedby theCommis-
sion but it is no less true that the recent refinement
of the three-step analysis seems to be rather vague,
because the objective pursued by the Member State
is decisive for the determination of whether a tax
measure could be regarded as materially selective
and, thus, it is essential to distinguish permissible
goals from impermissible goals,where a clear-cut line
cannot be drawn.
Only a case-by-case analysis could shed some light
on the concept ofmaterial selectivity of taxmeasures,
but in return a case law approach offers a fragment-
ed scenario that impairs legal certainty and that can
be takenadvantageof inorder to circumvent the com-
petition policy constraints. For these reasons and in
order to achieve the desirable degree of legal certain-
ty and the desiredpredictability of Commission´s de-
cisions, the author considers that a single unequivo-
cal test should apply.117
Moreover, it is clear that the General Court and the
Court of Justice have often shown different attitudes
regarding the weight in providing ground for a sort
of exemption fromState aid control and the interpre-
tative value as concerns the objectives set at the na-
tional level.118 In fact, we have witnessed that every
time the General Court attempts to propose alterna-
tive approaches, it is almost invariably overruled by
the Court of Justice,119 as can be clearly seen, for in-
stance, in theBritish Aggregates120 or theGibraltar121
cases.
In light of the above considerations it is legitimate
to conclude that case law shows that the practical ap-
plication of the selectivity criterion is rather ambigu-
ous.When it comes to geographical selectivity, a high
114 Merola considers that “the controversy surrounding fiscal aid is
due to the typical multi-purpose nature of tax measures, which
often combine macroeconomic and microeconomic goals (and
effects)”, M Merola, ‘The rebus of selectivity in fiscal aid: a non-
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115 A Bartosch, ‘Is there a need for a rule of reason in European State
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selectivity?’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review, 729, 745.
116 Opinion of AG Geelhoed of 18 September 2003 in Case
C-308/01 GIL Insurance [2006] ECR I-07115, [76].
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for” test (see C Micheau, ‘Tax selectivity in European Law of State
Aid: legal assessment and alternative approaches’ (2015) 3 Euro-
pean Law Review, 323, 340-341) or Luja recommends the intro-
duction of an additional step that would apply before the three-
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measure is broad enough (see R Luja, ‘Revisiting the balance
between aid, selectivity and selective aid in respect of taxes and
special levies’ (2010) Issue 1 European State Aid Law Quarterly,
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er Law International 2013), 107-118).
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degree of legal certainty in combination with a more
liberal approach on autonomous regions and their
competences is working very much to the delight of
Member States. But the same cannot be said in the
area ofmaterial selectivity, because here the jurispru-
dence of the EU Courts is highly casuistic, at times
conflicting and, in essence apparently advocating a
wide concept of material selectivity.122
122 A Bartosch, ‘The concept of selectivity’ in E Szyszczak (ed.),
Research Handbook on European State aid law (Edward Elgar
Publishing Limited 2011), 189-190.
